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Institutions and Entrepreneurship Quality 
 
 
Entrepreneurship contributes importantly to the economy. However, differences in the quality and 
quantity of entrepreneurship vary significantly across developing and developed countries. We use 
a sample of 70 countries over the period of 2005-2015 to examine how formal and informal 
institutional dimensions (availability of debt and venture capital, regulatory business environment, 
entrepreneurial cognition and human capital, corruption, government size, government support) 
affect the quality and quantity of entrepreneurship between developed and developing countries. 
Our results demonstrate that institutions are important for both the quality and quantity of 
entrepreneurship. However, not all institutions play a similar role; rather, there is a dynamic 
relationship between institutions and economic development.  
 
Keywords: Institutions, entrepreneurship, labor regulation, tax, bankruptcy, regulation, venture 
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Introduction 
Entrepreneurial activity makes an important contribution to economic growth (Carree & Thurik, 
2003; Holcombe, 2000; van Stel et al., 2005). Existing research has examined the micro- (van Praag, 
1999) and macro-level (Stenholm et al., 2013; Grilo & Thurik, 2005) elements that explain why 
different countries have different levels of entrepreneurship. These studies demonstrate that it is 
important to determine the cause of variations in entrepreneurship levels. Existing studies have focused 
on the role of institutions in fostering entrepreneurship (Estrin & Mickiewicz 2011; McMullen et al., 
2008; Sobel, 2008), either from a within-country perspective (Cole et al. 2016; Amorós, 2009) or a 
quality-of-institution perspective (Armour & Cumming, 2006, 2008; Amorós, 2009; Stenholm et al. 
2013). The ways in which changes in economic development and institutional conditions affect the 
quantity and quality of entrepreneurship in a country have received much less attention (Dorado & 
Ventresca, 2013; Sobel, 2008). To fill this important gap in the literature, the current study focuses on 
the relationship between the quality of institutions and the quantity and quality of entrepreneurship 
between countries with different levels of economic development. 
Institutional quality is often associated with more secure property rights, a well-functioning court 
system (Douhan & Henrekson, 2010; Mehlum et al., 2006; Acemoglu, 2005), personal bankruptcy 
(Armour & Cumming, 2008), resource endowment (Stenholm et al. 2013), availability of finance 
(Cole et al. 2016; Cumming & Zhang, 2016; Samila & Sorenson, 2011), availability of knowledge 
(Polyhart & Moliterno, 2011) and entrepreneurial capital (Stenholm et al. 2013). As a country’s 
institutional conditions change, a unique dynamic environment develops. This necessitates the need for 
a greater understanding of the match between the type (e.g. necessity, opportunity entrepreneurship) 
and quality (e.g. high growth, innovative, productive) of entrepreneurial activity. Institutions that 
provide “secure property rights, a fair and balanced judicial system, contract enforcement, and 
effective limits on government's ability to transfer wealth through taxation and regulation” (Sobel, 
2008: 644) versus their counterparts will see a difference in the quality of entrepreneurial activity.  
 3 
 
It is important to consider both the quantity and quality of entrepreneurship because not all 
entrepreneurship contributes equally to economic activity. For instance, Hurst and Pugsley (2012) 
found that a significant number of start-ups in the United States have little or no intention to grow. 
These low-quality/subsistence entrepreneurship activities, often (Schoar, 2010) motivated by 
necessity, only create jobs for their owners (Reynolds, 2010) and are unlikely to benefit society as a 
whole (Baumol, 1990). Meanwhile growth-oriented, productive, and transformational entrepreneurship 
tends to be more innovative by creating new products, processes and jobs, and extending the tax base 
for the government (Sobel, 2008).  
This study contributes to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to the entrepreneurship 
and institutions literature by combining North’s (1990) institutional theory with Williamson’s (2000) 
institutional hierarchy approach, Whitley’s (1999) national business systems (NBS) perspective and 
Baumol’s (1990) theory of the productivity of entrepreneurship. This allows us to explore the 
interactive and dynamic relationships between the formal and informal institutions and the quality and 
quantity of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial decision-making does not occur in a vacuum; it is based 
on a meticulous analysis of the institutional environment and available support structures (Whitley, 
1999; Williamson, 2000). Our empirical results directly support the synergies between the four 
different approaches in the institutional literature. Our most novel findings are that the relationship 
between institutional dimensions and the quality and quantity of entrepreneurial activity varies 
(Armour & Cumming, 2006, 2008; Amorós, 2009), and the strength of this relationship depends on the 
level of the country’s economic development. A more nuanced relationship between a type of 
institutional dimension and entrepreneurial choice was established and measured. Our ‘quality of 
entrepreneurship’ measure further expands upon Sobel’s (2008) measure. 
Secondly, this study contributes to the economic development literature by combining the North-
Williamson-Whitley-Baumol framework and using the economic development perspective 
(Wennekers et al. 2005). This demonstrates that countries with different levels of economic 
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development, quality of formal and informal institutions are likely to have different marginal effects 
on both quality and quantity of entrepreneurship. We also explore a non-linear relationship between 
various institutional dimensions and entrepreneurial activity. 
This study makes an important methodological contribution by merging data from various sources 
at a country level, including the World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Snapshot, the World 
Development Indicators, Doing Business Statistics, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), the Index of Economic Freedom of the Heritage Foundation, 
the World Economic Forum and World Governance Indicators expanding Cumming’s et al. (2014) 
approach to measuring entrepreneurship internationally. The following changes and their effect on 
entrepreneurship quality are investigated: changes in financial development and financial institutional 
support to entrepreneurship in the form of debt and equity financing; changes in labor, fiscal (corporate 
tax rate) and bankruptcy regulations (resolving insolvency); changes in informal regulations and 
corruption levels; changes in government size; and changes to regulatory measures related to 
government support of entrepreneurship and government programs. In addition, we also control for the 
availability of entrepreneurial capital and entrepreneurial cognition of the quality and quantity of 
entrepreneurship.  
Sobel’s (2008) study developed measures to establish the quality of entrepreneurship using cross-
sectional data for the 50 US states. Cumming and Li’s (2013) study identified the shortcomings of 
Sobel’s (2008) study and argued that studies relating to the impact of institutions on the quality and 
quantity of entrepreneurship should always use panel data, which enables consistent and robust 
findings. Building on the existent institutional and entrepreneurship literature and using the panel data 
technique, our major contribution is explaining the strength and size of the relationship between each 
institutional dimension and the quality and quantity of entrepreneurial activity in developed and 
developing countries (Cumming & Li, 2013; Sobel, 2008).  
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Finally, this study contributes to the resource-based view (RBV) literature by demonstrating that 
different types of entrepreneurship need different types of resources while changes in economic 
development change demand and supply for different types of resources. This dynamic environment 
requires an adjustment in policies allowing the combination and productive use of these resources. The 
results are both unexpected and intriguing.  
In the following sections we set the foundation of our theoretical argument and present our 
hypotheses that relate the quality of institutions to two types of entrepreneurship. We then present our 
data analysis and methodology, followed by a discussion of the results. We discuss policy implications 
and draw a number of conclusions. Finally, we analyze the limitations of this study and make 
suggestions for future research. 
The Dynamic Relationship between Institutions and Economic Development 
The relationship between institutions and economic development has long been debated. North 
(1997) argued that the institution is the primary source of development, and is also a factor in the poor 
performance of many developing countries: “Third World countries are poor because the institutional 
constraints define a set of payoffs to political/economic activity that does not encourage productive 
activity” (North, 1990, p. 110). Przeworski (2004, p. 15) argued that institutions and economic 
development are endogenous and suggested that institutions and development follow a feedback loop: 
“[if] institutions shape development, but development affects institutions, then institutions are 
endogenous with regard to their consequences”. While these studies demonstrate that institutions play 
an important role in economic development, other scholars have argued that institutions are not created 
in a vacuum; rather, historical events dictate the current quality of institutions in a country. For 
example, Banerjee and Iyer (2002, p. 1) suggested that “In the new institutionalist view, history 
matters because history shapes institutions and institutions shape the economy.” Other studies have 
suggested that institutions and subsequent development have a circular relationship, since political 
actors prefer to maintain the institutions that enabled them to rise to power: “Not only were certain 
fundamental characteristics of the New World economies and their factor endowments difficult to 
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change, but government policies and other institutions tended to reproduce the conditions that gave 
rise to them” (Sokoloff, 2000, p. 5). As these existing studies demonstrate, the relationship between 
institutions and economic development is very important. The following section will, therefore, 
discuss how institutions are related to entrepreneurial activities.  
Changes in Institutions and Entrepreneurship 
Institutions and entrepreneurial activities tend to have a bidirectional relationship. The theoretical 
underpinning of this paper is built on North (1990; 1994; 1997), Baumol (1990), Williamson (2000), 
and Whitley (1999). The literature on institutions (North, 1990; Baumol, 1990; Sobel, 2008) and 
entrepreneurship (Estrin & Mickiewicz 2011; Stenholm et al., 2013) assumes that institutional 
environments create the conditions for individual decision-making, which plays an important role in 
entrepreneurial cognition and the quality of entrepreneurship (Sobel, 2008). The “Institutional 
framework within which an activity is performed often determines whether this activity is productive, 
unproductive or destructive” (Douhan & Henrekson, 2010: 630). This implies that exogenous 
institutional reforms change the quality and quantity of entrepreneurial activity by changing the 
environment where decisions are taken and implemented. On the other hand, scholars argue that 
entrepreneurs act as agents of change by generating “… new organizational models and policies that 
change the direction and flow of organizational activity” (Hwang & Powell, 2005; p. 179) that lead to 
changes in the institutional environment. 
Institutions are “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction” (North, 1990: 3). According to North (1990; 1994; 1997), institutions create and establish 
the norms, rules, constraints, and incentives that operate as tools of governance for exchanges among 
individuals. Formal and informal institutions interact together and the impact of formal institutions can 
be influenced by the informal institutions (North, 2006; Smallbone & Welter, 2012, North, 1997, 
1990; Aparicio et al., 2016). Sobel (2008) built on Baumol (1990) and concluded that the political and 
legal institutions help to explain differences in the levels and quality of entrepreneurial activity across 
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US states, as well as economic prosperity. Baumol (1990) examined different historical institutional 
contexts such as Ancient Rome, the Sung Dynasty in China and the United Kingdom. The study 
concluded that institutional conditions were a major determinant of different types of entrepreneurship 
in these countries. Baumol's (1990) theory suggested that entrepreneurs exploit and commercialize 
opportunities both within private markets and within the political and legal environment, which 
Whitley (1999) defined as National Business Systems. Differences in the rates and quality of 
entrepreneurship are thus influenced by differences in entrepreneurial decision-making. These are 
channeled through the system of incentives by a specific combination of economic, political and legal 
institutions (Baumol, 1990). 
As institutions influence individual behavior, over time entrepreneurs also take the initiative to 
change the institutions that are beneficial to them. Maguire et al. (2004: 657) refer to these individuals 
as ‘institutional entrepreneurs’: “actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements 
and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones”. These actors 
“create a whole new system of meaning that ties the functioning of disparate sets of institutions 
together” (Garud et al., 2002). DiMaggio (1988: 14) argued that “new institutions arise when 
organized actors with sufficient resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value 
highly”. Since entrepreneurial decision-making is determined by the quality of institutions (Sobel, 
2008), productive entrepreneurship will generate more rewarding experiences for the entrepreneurs as 
the quality of the institutions changes (Baumol, 1990).  
The works of North (1990), Williamson (2000), and Whitley (1999) further help us to establish the 
four institutional factors that influence the quality of entrepreneurial activity. The highest layer is the 
Informal institutions of a country, which are embedded in a society and can become habitual (Estrin & 
Mickiewicz 2011, North, 2006, 1994; Aparicio et al., 2016; North, 1990). A country’s formal 
regulatory institutions are critical because they can reduce the uncertainty and risk associated with the 
entrepreneurial activity (Smallbone & Welter, 2012, Klapper et al., 2006). However, they can also be 
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burdensome and negatively influence entrepreneurship if, for example, the cost of complying with 
regulations is high (Klapper et al., 2006). The third layer of Williamson’s (2000) institutional 
framework that drives resource allocation is the governance layer.  
All of these layers influence the fourth and last layer - the resource allocation. Whitley’s (1999) 
four factors include a financial system, the availability of skills and development, the state and the 
relationship with governmental authority. The quality of the institutional environment influences an 
entrepreneur’s attitudes, motives, and the ability to mobilize resources (Reynolds, 2010; Schoar, 
2010). It also shapes the ‘rules of the game’, which in turn affects the quality of entrepreneurship 
(North, 1990; Baumol, 1990; McMullen et al., 2008). Combining the theoretical frameworks 
developed by North (1990), Williamson (2000), Whitley (1999) and Baumol (1990), we argue that the 
quality and rate of entrepreneurship in a country is likely to be significantly influenced by six 
important dimensions - 1) level of financial development; 2) availability of entrepreneurial capital and 
cognition; 3) the regulatory framework; 4) corruption; 5) government size; and 6) government support. 
We will now discuss each of these dimensions and how they influence the quality and quantity of 
entrepreneurship in the context of developed and developing countries (Rodrik et al., 2004).        
Changes in the Level of Financial Development and Entrepreneurship 
The need for financial resources for entrepreneurs varies across countries. The extant literature 
suggests that are several reasons for this, such as the structure of laws and their enforcement (La Porta 
et al., 2002; La Porta, et al., 2006), regulations relating to liabilities and rules and their influence on the 
stock market (La Porta et al., 2006), and the protection of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2002).  
In developing countries, scarcity drives up the value of financial resources in stark contrast to the 
relative abundance of finance in developed countries. Whitley (1999) argued that a country’s financial 
system, such as its credit-market or capital-market, is important for shaping its economic behavior. 
This paper argues that financial development and economic development are interdependent. This is 
because pressure grows on financial institutions to develop in response to increased demands for 
economic activity as economic development continues.  
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Entrepreneurs often rely on their personal wealth or inheritance (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994a, b). 
They may also use informal networks such as friends and family to acquire financial resources or 
formal networks such as customers, suppliers and so on (Davidsson & Honig, 2003). In addition, they 
often face difficulties in obtaining external financial sources due to a lack of collateral, legitimacy, and 
asymmetry of information (Black & Strahan, 2002). This lack of financial resources often leads to a 
lack of investment in activities needed for high-growth entrepreneurship.  
As the level of economic development changes, financial institutions also experience an increase 
in both savings and competition. This changing environment is better able to contribute to productive 
entrepreneurial activity since entrepreneurs can channel these increased savings rate into 
entrepreneurial activity through their own lending and investments at a lower cost (Cumming & 
Zhang, 2016). Black and Strahan (2002) found that increased competition increased investments in 
productive entrepreneurial activities rather than the non-productive type. Alternative sources of 
funding for entrepreneurs have also increased across countries (Cumming & Zhang, 2016). 
An improved economic state coupled with improvement in institutional conditions helps to 
develop the confidence of outside investors, such as venture capitalists, angels and so on (Cumming & 
Zhang, 2016). As the existing literature suggests, an increase in the supply of venture capital (VC) has 
a positive relationship with entrepreneurship. Samila and Sorenson (2011) included venture capital as 
an explanatory variable in their analysis of US metropolitan areas during the period 1993-2002 and 
found that the increased availability of venture capital increases the numbers of firms and causes 
employment and aggregate incomes to grow. Cole et al. (2016) found venture capital had a similar 
positive effect on US states during 1995-2011. Access to finance is likely to improve the quality of 
entrepreneurship through channeling their business into more productive activities (Sobel, 2008). 
Haselman and Wachtel’s (2010) study included 20 transition economies and found that banks expand 
credit access to small business in a relatively well-functioning legal environment to a greater extent 
than their counterparts in countries where the legal environment does not function as well. Similar 
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results were obtained by La Porta et al. (1999) and Djankov et al. (2007). Taken together, the evidence 
suggests that improvements to institutions have a greater effect on the quality of entrepreneurship in 
developing economies than in developed economies due to the differing distances from the production 
frontier and the need for institutional improvement. Based on this, we hypothesize that:     
Hypothesis 1a: The positive effects of financial development on the quantity of entrepreneurship will 
be stronger in developing countries than developed countries.  
Hypothesis 1b: The positive effects of financial development on the quality of entrepreneurship will 
be stronger in developing countries than developed countries.  
Changes in the Availability of Entrepreneurial Capital 
The availability of resources and incentives to use them to create wealth are additional 
determinants of productive entrepreneurial activity (Barney, 1991; Sobel, 2008). The resource-based 
view (RBV) suggests that combining a firm’s internal resources can create a competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991). The same concept can be applied to countries, which can combine their own resources 
such as human capital (both individual and collective) (Polyhart & Moliterno, 2011, Kraaijenbrink, 
2011) to create a competitive advantage. Knowledge improves an individual’s cognitive abilities and 
helps them identify, analyze and use opportunities, leading to more productive economic activities 
(Polyhart & Moliterno, 2011, Kraaijenbrink, 2011; Stenholm et. al. 2013). This paper uses the terms 
‘human capital’ and ‘entrepreneurial capital’ interchangeably. Higher entrepreneurial capital is 
associated with the greater commercialization of knowledge and ideas if those exist in the market and 
enhance the quantity of entrepreneurship. The existing literature shows that experiences related to the 
labor market, management experience and entrepreneurial experience have a positive relationship with 
entrepreneurial activity (Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Whitley, 1999). Meanwhile, Sobel (2008) referred 
to the importance of incentive structures, where individuals with high levels of human capital are more 
likely to engage in the creation of new wealth through productive market entrepreneurship.  
As a country’s economic conditions change, the quality of its labor force also changes due to 
different experiences in the labor market (Boucekkine et al., 2002). This enables individuals to 
leverage various institutional contexts to channel their formal and tacit knowledge to market and 
improve the quality of entrepreneurial activity. The availability of entrepreneurial capital can act as a 
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‘resource slack’ - a useable resource that can be deployed to adapt to the changing institutional 
environment and create a competitive landscape (Levinthal, 1997).  
Changes in the quality of human capital in both developed and developing economies due to 
higher education and labor market experience may change the self-efficacy of individuals and their 
level of cognition (Korosteleva & Belitski, 2017). We define self-efficacy as “a person’s confidence in 
their ability to perform tasks” (Cassar & Friedman, 2009, p. 2), which is positively associated with 
increased expectations and better performance (Luszczynska, et al., 2005). The increased availability 
of entrepreneurial capital at various levels of economic development is likely to have a positive effect 
on both the quantity and quality of the entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial capital affects entrepreneurial 
decision-making and the ability to recognize opportunities when undertaking entrepreneurial activity 
(Cassar & Friedman, 2009). In addition to the institutional context, economic development plays an 
important role in a relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship quality. In developing 
countries where the opportunity cost of starting a business is low, entrepreneurial capital is likely to 
increase entrepreneurial entry and self-select highly educated individuals into more productive 
activities. Based on this we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2a: The positive effect of entrepreneurial capital on the quantity of entrepreneurship will 
be stronger for developing countries than developed countries.  
Hypothesis 2b: The positive effect of entrepreneurial capital on the quality of entrepreneurship will be 
stronger for developing countries than developed countries.  
Regulatory Framework 
The institutional environment of a country consists of both formal and informal components 
(North, 1990; Williamson, 2000), differentiated by what is codified and ‘official’ versus what is 
common practice (North, 1990). Formal institutions include regulatory policy, which has many 
different dimensions (e.g. tax policy, environmental compliance, contract enforcement, bankruptcy 
law, licensing and permits) and a wide range of policy tools (e.g. fees, paperwork requirements, time 
to deal with regulation). A country’s regulatory environment entails both the complexity of the 
regulations and enforcement of the regulations. Cumbersome regulations and delays in obtaining 
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necessary permits and licenses may delay the start-up process, and could even deter individuals from 
engaging in entrepreneurship (van Stel et al., 2007; Klapper et al., 2006).  
Changes in a country’s economic conditions can force policymakers to adopt specific policies that 
are more aligned with the changing environment of a country (Sobel et al., 2007). We look at three 
important types of regulation, the first of which is labor market regulation. Grossman and Shapiro 
(1982) found that when there is a change in an economy, the labor market is more responsive than 
other areas of the economy. Any regulations that hinder an entrepreneur’s opportunity to make an 
adjustment to the labor force will thus reduce entrepreneurial entry and negatively affect the incentives 
motivating high-quality entrepreneurship. The second type is fiscal regulation and tax rates. The 
empirical research on the relationship between corporate taxation and entrepreneurship has been mixed 
(Belitski et al. 2016). High taxation on earned income by entrepreneurs reduces the portion of income 
available to entrepreneurs, because if the tax rate is applied uniformly regardless of size then small 
businesses may bear a higher burden of taxes. This creates a moral hazard (Keuschnigg & Nielsen, 
2004). The existing literature suggests that taxation of business profits and the ability to offset losses 
when entrepreneurs face troubling times can serve as a form of insurance (Belitski et al. 2016; 
Keuschnigg & Nielsen, 2004).  
The third type is bankruptcy law. Prior research has found bankruptcy law to be a strong predictor 
of the quantity of entrepreneurship (Armour & Cumming, 2006, 2008), with only limited evidence 
available on the quality of entrepreneurship (Armour & Cumming, 2006). Bankruptcy law is a type of 
formal institution that is a concern of policymakers and can affect the level of entrepreneurship present 
in a country (Armour & Cumming, 2006, 2008; Lee et al., 2011). It is a central institutional factor 
related to a formal layer of regulation along with fiscal and labor market reform, as well as other doing 
business environments (Armour & Cumming, 2008).  
Empirical evidence suggests that bankruptcy laws have an important impact on the quantity of 
entrepreneurship. Armour and Cumming (2008) investigated the relationship between bankruptcy laws 
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and entrepreneurship using data on self-employment over the period 1990-2005 and between fifteen 
countries in order to study the importance of personal bankruptcy laws for self-employment. Lee’s et 
al (2011) study included 29 countries covering 19 years and concluded that business-friendly 
bankruptcy laws positively influence firm entry. Fan and White’s (2003) study covered all of the states 
in the US and found that states with business-friendly bankruptcy laws encouraged risk-averse 
entrepreneurs to engage in entrepreneurial activity. A similar result can be found in Armour and 
Cumming’s (2006) paper, which included 14 European countries and the US. The study concluded that 
bankruptcy laws that allow failed entrepreneurs to close their failed business and restart quickly 
increase the demand for venture capital. The ability to recover from insolvency quickly is directly 
associated with the strength of the insolvency framework.  
Other studies also showed that policymakers interested in increasing entrepreneurship levels in a 
country can help by reducing the cost and time associated with bankruptcy (Armour & Cumming, 
2008; Peng et al., 2010). In summary, stricter regulations and higher compliance costs with different 
forms of regulation constrain entrepreneurial activities in countries and affect the choice between 
productive or unproductive entrepreneurship (Sobel, 2008). 
Hypothesis 3a: The positive effects of an improved regulatory environment (labor markets, fiscal 
and bankruptcy laws) on the quantity of entrepreneurship will be stronger in developing countries 
than developed countries. 
Hypothesis 3b: The positive effects of an improved regulatory environment (labor markets, fiscal 
and bankruptcy laws) on the quality of entrepreneurship will be stronger in developing countries 
than developed countries.    
Corruption and Entrepreneurship 
Informal institutions include norms and customs which govern behavior (e.g. corruption, 
customary land rights). Corruption can be considered as an informal institution and an indicator of 
poor quality institutions (Mohammadi Khyareh, 2017; Wiseman, 2015). This paper defines corruption 
as the use of public office for private gain (Rose-Ackerman, 2007, 1999). The existence of corruption 
in a society increases uncertainty and ambiguity for its entrepreneurs and renders every transaction less 
transparent (Anokhin & Schulze, 2009; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006) and adds additional costs onto each 
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transaction. Entrepreneurs situated in a corrupt country, be it developed or developing, can be 
vulnerable to exploitation by government authorities. Such circumstances can include high transaction 
costs when waiting for permits or services, as representatives of government authorities can demand 
bribes. Festus et al. (2014) investigated the impact of corruption on entrepreneurship in Nigeria and 
found it to be a major inhibitor of both rural and urban entrepreneurs. Wiseman (2015) studied all the 
states of the US and found that corruption (as a measure of institutional quality) had a negative impact 
on productive entrepreneurship. 
Another strand of literature suggests that corruption can pave the way to avoid an inefficient 
regulatory environment. Scholars argue that in countries where corruption is expected in every 
transaction (Méon & Weill, 2010), the expectation ameliorates the ‘arbitrariness’ of corruption and 
greases the wheels of business. Dhreher and Gassebner (2013) studied 43 countries and found a 
positive relationship between corruption and entrepreneurship in highly regulated countries. 
Szyliowicz and Wadhwani (2007) study analyzed cross-sectional panel data from 175 countries and 
found a positive relationship between corruption and entrepreneurship. The study suggested that 
entrepreneurs can use corruption as a mechanism to enter new markets that were previously blocked.   
Economic development and efficiency of regulation in a country can gradually change the culture 
of corruption (Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2011) by increasing the level of transparency and freedom of the 
press and improving the functioning of the legal systems; all of which are required for the organized 
market system to function (Broadman & Recanatini, 2001). Corruption can be a deterrent for both the 
quality and quantity of entrepreneurship by increasing entry barriers (Anokhin & Schulze, 2009; 
Klapper et al., 2006). Anokhin and Schulze (2009) examined the relationship between corruption, 
innovation, and entrepreneurship in 64 countries. The study concluded that countries that are able to 
control and reduce corruption experience an increase in entrepreneurship and innovation. The quality 
of entrepreneurship may be particularly affected by corruption as government officials see more 
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opportunities to charge high-growth entrepreneurs. This is because they have a higher rate of return to 
productive activity than to unproductive activity (Sobel, 2008). Based on this we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 4a: Corruption has a stronger positive effect on the quantity of entrepreneurship in 
developing countries. 
Hypothesis 4b: Corruption has a stronger negative effect on the quality of entrepreneurship in 
developed countries. 
Government Size  
The size of a government reflects its fiscal, legal and collective capacity to function effectively 
(Besley & Persson, 2014a and b). In order to create strong social institutions and implement its 
policies, the government needs to have stable sources of revenue. Taxes are a major source of 
government revenue. Compared to developed countries, many developing countries lack the sources of 
revenue needed to provide quality government services. The taxation and economic development 
literature suggest that developing countries are at a disadvantage with respect to their tax bases as a 
source of government revenue. Ebeke and Ehrhart (2011) investigated sub-Saharan African countries 
and concluded that public investment suffers when a government lacks stable sources of revenue.     
Compared to developed countries, developing countries have a large informal sector. This makes it 
difficult for the government to generate revenue from the unproductive or destructive entrepreneurs 
who conduct opaque transactions (La Porta & Shleifer, 2014). La Porta and Shleifer (2014) argued that 
individuals are motivated to remain in the informal sector in order to avoid paying taxes. Another 
study by Gordon and Li (2009) found that firms are more likely to conduct their business in cash if the 
financial sector is not well developed. Government resources in developed countries with high levels 
of compliance with regulations are thus likely to be used in more productive activities (e.g. business 
support, incubation, infrastructure development) than individual rent-seeking (Sobel, 2008). 
Meanwhile, lower levels of government revenue may create risks and lead to a weaker state capacity: 
“While much research in political economy points out the benefits of ‘limited government’, political 
scientists have long emphasized the problems created in many less-developed nations by ‘weak states’, 
which lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the political and social 
challenges from non-state actors” (Acemoglu, 2005: 1199). 
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Another strand of literature related to government spending suggests that it can have both positive 
and negative effects on the level of economic development (Koellinger & Minniti, 2009; McMullen et 
al., 2008). The literature related to the welfare state and entrepreneurship suggests a large government 
sector has a negative impact on entrepreneurship (Koellinger & Minniti, 2009; McMullen et al., 2008). 
Meanwhile, social norms of compliance also improve and resources accumulate when members of 
society receive government services in return for tax payments (Brautigam et al., 2008). The insurance 
effect is likely to be stronger in developing countries, as the state will need to create a ‘safety net’ due 
to high market risks and crises related to inefficient institutions and support entrepreneurial entry 
(Sobel, 2008). Larger governments aim to tax high–growth productive entrepreneurs, which may also 
decrease the rate of returns of productive activities. Over-regulation and large government size 
associated with high tax rates will negatively affect growth aspirations and the quality of 
entrepreneurship. Based on these we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 5a: The positive effects of government size on the quantity of entrepreneurship will be 
stronger for developing countries than developed countries. 
Hypothesis 5b: The negative effects of government size on the quality of entrepreneurship will be 
stronger for developed countries than developing countries. 
Government Programs and Support   
Government involvement in the private sector is not new, and governments have been active in 
managing and promoting programs to generate entrepreneurship across countries. Verheul et al. (2002) 
suggested that governments influence both the supply and demand sides of entrepreneurship. Scholars 
have found that there are several government policies in developed countries that have influenced the 
supply side of entrepreneurship (Cumming et al., 2017; Cooper, 2003; Lerner & Kegler, 2000). For 
example, the United States Congress enacted the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program 
in 1982 in order to increase American competitiveness. The legislation mandated funding for 
innovative small businesses (Cooper, 2003; Lerner & Kegler, 2000). Many European governments 
have instituted venture capital for new high-tech firms (Cumming et al., 2017; Cumming & Johan, 
2013). Government programs can serve the same purpose as entrepreneurs situated in the developing 
countries. We therefore hypothesize:   
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Hypothesis 6a: The positive effect of government programs on the quantity of entrepreneurship is 
stronger in developing countries than in developed countries.  
Hypothesis 6a: Government programs have a positive effect on the quality of entrepreneurship in 
both developing and developed countries.  
Data and Methodology 
Data and Sample 
We constructed our sample by matching data from the following sources over 2005-2015 at the 
country level: the World Development Indicators, the Doing Business Database, the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), the World Economic Forum 
(WEF), and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Our sample included both 
developed and developing countries for an in-depth view of any trends or variance around the world 
(Stenholm et al., 2013). The dataset is an unbalanced panel which covers 70 countries over the period 
2005-2015 and includes 23 countries which were observed for less than 10 years and 3 countries 
which were observed for less than 5 years. Our final sample included 626 observations of the variables 
of interest where data is available. All institutional data is reported in Table 1. The variables vary 
across and within countries over time with a time series variation over 2005-2015. This enables us to 
test for relationships between various institutional dimensions and entrepreneurial activity.  
Considering the few missing observations, researchers often use averaged indicators to predict the 
role of institutions in entrepreneurial activity. This is incorrect, as it may produce different results so 
that causality could not be claimed. Following Cumming et al. (2014) and Cumming and Li (2013), we 
opt for panel data estimation which includes measures of changes in labor, fiscal and bankruptcy 
regulation over time (2005-2015). It also has variables measuring the availability of capital, skills, 
entrepreneurial cognition and government programs over time, and allows us to make inferences about 
the relationship between the above institutional dimensions and entrepreneurial activity conditional on 
various levels of economic development. Changes in data over time enable us to capture changes in 
institutions and their impact on entrepreneurial activity (Stenholm et al. 2013). A number of control 
variables from various sources (GEM, doingbusiness.org) are available with measurement changes 
over the period 2005-2015. 
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Given the longitudinal nature of our sample, Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics, means and 
separates standard deviation within (over time) and between (over countries) variation. For example, 
an average amount of taxes payable as a share of commercial profits is 63.57. However, the variance in 
the tax rate between countries is between 34.33 and 96.72, while the variance within (overtime period 
2005-15) is between 46.61 and 85.83.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 Dependent Variables 
Our dependent variables include measures of the quantity and quality of entrepreneurship. The 
quantity of entrepreneurship in a country is measured by its ‘new business ownership rate’. The new 
business ownership rate is the percentage of the population aged 18-64 who are owners of a new 
business, i.e. those who own and manage a start-up that has paid salaries, wages or any other payments 
to the owners for a period between 3 and 42 months (McMullen et al., 2008; Reynolds et al., 2002). 
This indicator is taken directly from GEM.  
To test the hypotheses related to the quality of entrepreneurship we constructed measures for 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship. This is a novel approach building on the recent quality 
of entrepreneurship review by Mohammadi Khyareh (2017), as new variables were used to construct 
productive and unproductive entrepreneurship. We used measures available in the World Economic 
Forum (WEF Global Competitiveness Report), GEM and WIPO data over 2005-2015, drawing on 
principles of productive and unproductive entrepreneurial behavior (Baumol, 1990). We drew from the 
existing literature (Sobel, 2008; Mohammadi Khyareh, 2017) and created a net entrepreneurial 
productivity (NEP) index for 74 countries following Sobel’s (2008) approach but using six new 
proxies. These proxies capture entrepreneurial behavior and the environment in a country which may 
affect the choice between productive and unproductive entrepreneurship (see Table A3 in online 
Appendix). In order to compute a single index number, we employed the Borda Count Index 
classification system that normalizes all variables over the same range and weighs them equally. The 
NEP is calculated as the difference between unproductive and productive entrepreneurship scores for 
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each year over the period 2005-2015. Productive entrepreneurial activity is measured by combining the 
total (resident plus non-resident) patent applications in the country; the percentage of firms involved in 
total entrepreneurship activity (TEA) that introduce a product new to the market (GEM) and the 
percentage of firms involved in TEA which aim to creating at least 6 jobs over the next 5 years (GEM) 
(Estrin & Mickiewicz 2011). Unproductive entrepreneurship is based on the studies by Sobel and 
Garrett (2002) and Sobel (2008) using the WEF and GEM. Unproductive entrepreneurship is measured 
by averaging three different measures: the unethical behavior of firms (inverse of ethical behavior) 
(WEF), the extent that crime imposes costs on business (inverse of no cost to high cost) (WEF), and 
necessity driven TEA, which is defined as a percentage involved in TEA because they had no other 
option for work (McMullen et al., 2008). A positive NEP score means the country is characterized by 
more productive than unproductive entrepreneurial behavior. Meanwhile a NEP score of zero reflects 
the same position (rank) for productive and unproductive entrepreneurship, which means productive 
and unproductive behavior is almost equal (see Table A3 in online Appendix)1.     
Independent Variables 
Table 1 lists the independent variables used in this study. The financial development of a country is 
used to test our H1 and is measured by the extent to which banks provide domestic credit to the private 
sector (La Porta et al., 2002) from the World Development Indicator database. We added two new 
variables to account for the availability of alternative sources of funding for entrepreneurs following 
Cumming and Zhang (2016), such as venture capital availability (WEF, Global Competitiveness 
report). We also controlled for emerging sources of entrepreneurial finance, such as financing through 
the local equity market available in the WEF Report. This is a novel indicator used for equity financing 
in this study. The availability of entrepreneurial capital in the country is used to test H2 and was 
measured as the percentage of the 18-64 population who believe that they have developed the skills 
                                                 
1 A negative NEP score means the country is characterized by more unproductive than productive entrepreneurial behavior (see Table A2 in 
online Appendix). The countries ranked as having the top five NEP scores are Denmark, Singapore, Luxembourg, Sweden and Australia. These five 
countries have the most productive entrepreneurship in comparison with their levels of unproductive entrepreneurship. The five countries ranking 
the lowest are Philippines, Jamaica, Bulgaria, Pakistan and Bangladesh. These countries have the highest levels of unproductive entrepreneurship 
relative to productive entrepreneurship.  
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and knowledge needed to start a business (perceived capabilities). We also used the percentage of 18-
64 year-olds who see good opportunities to start a firm in the area where they live (perceived 
opportunities), both used previously from GEM data by Stenholm et al. (2013).  
The regulatory business environment is used to test our H3. Firstly, we used bankruptcy laws and 
the legal consequences of personal bankruptcy (strength of resolving insolvency index, recovery 
insolvency cost and recovery rate) (van Stel et al., 2005). Several elements of bankruptcy law were 
explored from developed countries (Armour & Cumming, 2006, 2008; Amorós et al., 2009). Secondly, 
we used labor regulations which reflect various aspects of a country’s labor market and are available 
over time as a labor freedom component (McMullen et al., 2008).  
Thirdly, we used fiscal regulation as changes in corporate tax rate which measures the statutory 
tax rate (% of commercial profits). These are used to determine a business’s tax payable amount, and 
were previously used by Belitski et al. (2016) as well as Doingbusiness.org. Although labor and fiscal 
regulations have been used previously, bankruptcy regulations have to be included within the same 
regulatory framework (Fan & White, 2003; Armour & Cumming, 2008) to exploit the full magnitude 
of the relationship. A country’s corruption level is used to test our H4 and is measured by individual’s 
perceptions about the use of public office for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests (Rose-Ackerman, 2007; 
Kaufman et al. 2010; Belitski et al 2016).  
Government spending is used to test H5 and was measured by the general government’s final 
consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP. To make the interpretation easier, we follow 
Reynolds (2010) in transforming the Heritage Foundation measure of government expense to obtain 
the original ratio of government expense to GDP. The government entrepreneurship programs 
indicator was collected from GEM to test H6 (Estrin & Mickiewicz 2011). It uses a 1-5 point scale to 
evaluate the presence and quality of programs directly assisting SMEs at all levels of government 
(national, regional and municipal). 
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Control Variables 
We have included several control variables. The working-age population of a country is measured 
by the percentage of the total population aged from 15 to 64 which was taken from World 
Development Indicator (WDI). Studies have shown that certain age groups are more likely to engage 
in entrepreneurship than others (Reynolds et al., 1999). The unemployment level of each country was 
measured by the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking 
employment (Verheul et al., 2002). The trade openness of a country was measured by total trade, 
which includes the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of the gross 
domestic product (McMullen et al., 2008). Access to natural resources was measured by the income 
generated from the mineral rents (% of GDP) taken from the World Bank (Gordon & Li 2009). The 
gross enrolment in tertiary education (%) is an important control for human capital, and is expressed as 
a percentage of the total population regardless of age (Polyhart & Moliterno, 2011). To measure the 
rule of law enforcement and bankruptcy laws on entrepreneurship we included: the number of 
procedures required to register property, the number of days required to enforce a contract, insolvency 
costs (% of estate) and recovery rates (cents on the dollar). This data came from Doingbusiness.org, 
and enabled us to build on important studies which demonstrate the significant impact that personal 
bankruptcy and pre-bankruptcy indebtedness has on entrepreneurship (Armour and Cumming, 2006, 
2008). To measure the role of alternative equity financing on the quality and quantity of 
entrepreneurship, we added an ordinal variable - companies raise money by issuing shares and/or 
bonds on the capital market from 1 to 7 (equity) (Cumming & Johan, 2013). 
To capture the regulatory changes in the country’s entrepreneurship policy, we added a binary 
variable of entrepreneurship reform in a country in a year (Klepper et al., 2006). A country’s level of 
economic development was measured by creating a binary variable ‘rich’, which equals one in 
countries with a GDP per capita in 2010 USD constant prices greater or equal 25,000 USD and is zero 
otherwise. Table A1 in the appendix shows the correlation coefficients between the variables used in 
this study.  
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Model 
To test our hypotheses, we use random and fixed effects panel estimation to combine the country 
and time effects (Cumming et al., 2014). This enables us to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
across countries and time in one model. We follow Wallace and Hussain (1969) and Baltagi (2008), 
among others, by estimating the regression model given by (1) with two-way error component 
disturbances (2).  denotes the unobservable country effect (Baltagi, 2008),  denotes the 
unobservable time effect and is the remainder stochastic disturbance term. Note that is country-
invariant and accounts for any time-specific effect not included in the regression. For example, it could 
account for government program intervention year effects that disrupt entrepreneurship and drive more 
quality of business.  is time invariant and accounts for any country-specific effects, such as culture 
and informal institutional frameworks. In vector form, our panel data estimation is written as:   
  i=1,..., N;    t=1,...,T     (1) 
 uit=  +  + eit          (2) 
where yit is either quality or quantity of entrepreneurship in a given country i at time t. β and Ɵ are 
parameters to be estimated, xit is a vector of independent explanatory variables and zit is a vector of 
exogenous control variables;  presents interaction of economic development with a number of 
institutional variables at time t by country i. These include entrepreneurial capital, financial 
development, regulation, corruption and government size and support. As mentioned above, the error 
term uit consists of unobserved country and time specific effects and the remainder disturbance.eit 
independent and identically distributed.  
Our choice to use both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) rather than choosing between 
them was driven by the limitations of FE as discussed by Baltagi (2008). First, estimating (N − 1) will 
introduce extra parameters, which may aggravate the problem of multicollinearity among the 
regressors. Second, an FE estimator cannot estimate the effect of any time-invariant variable (a country 
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which has remained in a developing or developed group over the estimation period). Time-invariant 
variables are wiped out by the Q transformations, the deviations from means transformation.  
It is also important to compare and contrast FE and RE estimations, as they use different 
assumptions on two-way error terms when drawing policy. RE estimations model only one additional 
parameter instead of (N-1) by making greater assumptions, which makes it more efficient yet 
vulnerable to bias (Baltagi, 2008). In contrast, the fixed effects model allows for the endogeneity of all 
the regressors with these country effects. We test t endogeneity in the model (1) using the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity in Appendix B (Davidson & MacKinnon, 
1993). FE and RE are an ‘all or nothing’ choice of homogeneity of the regressors and country effects 
(Baltagi, 2008). These over-identification restrictions are also testable using a Hausman-type test (see 
Table 2). The results of the augmented regression test and joint significance of the residuals F-test do 
not provide empirical evidence of endogeneity in the model (1). 
To address the concern of multicollinearity, we used a variance inflation factor (VIF) in both 
models with quality and quantity of entrepreneurship as dependent variables. Although several 
variables have high scores (e.g. time to enforce contracts (45), population in logs (40), equity finance 
(35) which are higher than the ‘rule of thumb’ (Kutner et al., 2004), the average VIF for each model2 is 
11 which is close to the advised boundary of 5-10.  
To reflect the size of the effect and control for the possible nonlinear relationship between a 
variety of institutional contexts and the quantity and quality of entrepreneurship, we note that the 
significance and size of beta coefficients might not always reflect the nature of the relationship. We, 
therefore, calculated post-estimated predictive margins for each institutional dimension using the 
results of the FE regression (columns 7 and 8, Table 2) with the quantity and quality of 
entrepreneurship as the dependent variable (Figure 1). The margins are a tool to explain a relationship 
when the direction of the relationship may be nonlinear, rending the net effect is statistically 
                                                 
2 Please refer to robustness check section for further details 
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insignificant. The predictive margins enable us to visualize how a change in each of the six 
institutional dimensions contributes to a marginal change in the quantity and quality of 
entrepreneurship across a distribution of each institutional dimension and between developing and 
developed countries. Building on Williams (2012) and Rising (2012), the beta coefficients in Table 2 
provide averaged results of model estimation and are limited in capturing non-linear effects. For 
example, a one-unit change in institutional dimension may result in a disproportional change in 
entrepreneurship activity at different levels of institutional dimension, which cannot be captured by the 
beta coefficient. Figure 1 illustrates the margins of responses for specified values of covariates. It uses 
95% confidence intervals to measure the boundaries of the effect of various institutional contexts on 
entrepreneurship.         
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Results and Discussion 
We interpret our findings and conclusions related to our hypotheses using the predictive margins shown in 
Figure 1 (Figure 1 in online appendix includes some of the predictive margins due to page limitations) 
These were calculated based on the results of FE estimations (coefficients in base effects and interaction 
effects) with the quantity and quality of entrepreneurship (Table 2) as the dependent variables. Table 2 
includes both basic models for RE (column 1-2) and FE (column 3-4) and models with interaction terms 
(column 5-6) for RE estimation and (column 7-8) for FE estimation. The signs of the coefficients and 
confidence intervals between RE and FE estimation are similar, although the significance of the 
coefficients is stronger when estimated with FE. The Hausman test also supports the use of FE. The results 
had a stronger statistical significance for the relationship between entrepreneurship and venture capital 
(VC), corruption, government support programs, entrepreneurial reform and procedures to register 
property.  
The post-estimation predictive margins presented in Figure 1 were calculated based on columns 7-
8 (Table 2). We used the ‘margins’ command in a statistical software STATA 15 to compute the 
standard errors of the means. The marginsplot command was used afterward as it gives a good view of 
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the shape of the relationship and its economic significance (Williams, 2012). It illustrates the strength 
and direction of the relationship as well as changes in the marginal effect between each of the six 
institutional dimensions and entrepreneurship activity and between developing and developed 
countries. For example, predictive margins allow us to phrase a question such as ‘What would be the 
quality of entrepreneurship activity as a domestic credit to private sector (% GDP) moves from 10 to 
50 for a developing (developed) country?’ It also allows us to make efficient comparisons between 
developed and developing countries to directly test our hypotheses, as well as measure the economic 
size of the effect of each change in institutional dimension.  
Our H1a and H1b are supported; the availability of domestic credit (Figure 1A) and VC finance 
(Figure 1B) are positively related to the quantity and quality of entrepreneurship, and the effect is 
stronger for developing countries. We used equity financing as a control variable for financial 
development in a country. We examined the difference in the effects of debt financing (domestic credit 
to the private sector by banks, % GDP) and VC capital availability on the quality and quantity of 
entrepreneurship. We did so by producing the post-estimation t-test on the beta coefficients of debt 
financing and VC availability. The p-values of the t-test which assumed VC and debt financing effects 
are equal in both quantity and quality of entrepreneurship are reported below Table 4 as ‘t-test for β 
debt financing = β capital financing (p-value)’. The coefficient is positive and significant for both the 
quality and quantity of entrepreneurship, but the size of the effect differs. The p-values of the t-test 
which states that betas are equal are greater than 5% for the quantity of entrepreneurship and lower 
than 5% for the quality of entrepreneurship.  
These findings provide important insights (see Figure 1). Firstly, the availability of VC capital 
compared to debt financing increases the quality of entrepreneurship for both developed and 
developing countries. At the highest level of debt financing, the expected NEP score is 10 for 
developing countries and zero effect for developed countries. Meanwhile, at the highest level of VC 
financing, the expected NEP score is 25 for developing countries and 20 for developed countries. 
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Secondly, there is no difference between availability of debt and VC financing for the quantity of 
entrepreneurship between developed and developing countries. This finding is similar to Cole’s et al. 
(2016) results: a stronger and positive effect of VCs on the quality of entrepreneurship vs. the effects 
of bank finance on the quality, which is statistically weak (see the t-test beneath Table 2). It is also 
likely that bank finance is more common in developed countries, resulting in a greater effect in the 
developed country context (Cumming & Zhang, 2016). The results also suggest that developed 
countries allocate more financial resources to entrepreneurial activity than their developing country 
counterparts. This helps to generate higher levels of entrepreneurship, in terms of both quantity and 
quality. 
In H2, we predicted that entrepreneurial capital would be positively associated with both the 
quality and quantity of entrepreneurship and the effect would be stronger for developing countries. We 
found support for H2a, which posits that entrepreneurial skills (Figure 1C) and opportunities (Figure 
1D) significantly increase the quantity of entrepreneurship. However, we found mixed results for H2b. 
Unlike the effect of entrepreneurial skills in developing countries, there is an inverted U-shape 
relationship between entrepreneurial skills and quality of entrepreneurship in developed countries. The 
predictive margins suggest that a higher degree of entrepreneurial capital increases the quality of 
entrepreneurship, and then reverses direction so that the effects become negative (right column, Figure 
1C).  
The results suggest that entrepreneurial cognition and high-quality skills become a resource for 
incumbent firms. In this instance, individuals are likely to consider the opportunity costs of engaging 
in entrepreneurial activity compared to a wage-paying job. When we include the interaction effect of 
economic development, we find partial support for our H2b. We also find that the effect of 
entrepreneurial capital moderated by economic development on the quantity of entrepreneurship is 
positive. The positive effect of entrepreneurial capital on the quality of entrepreneurship holds mostly 
for the existence and recognition of opportunity and to a lesser extent for entrepreneurial skills. Our 
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results are partly consistent with prior findings for entrepreneurship cognition across developed and 
developing countries (Stenholm et al., 2013; Korosteleva & Belitski, 2015) and suggest that while 
recognition and opportunity for exploitation are more important they depend largely on the context.  
We found support for H3a: the effects of improvements in fiscal, labor and bankruptcy regulations 
have a stronger impact on the quantity of entrepreneurship in developing countries (Fig. 1E- G) 
extending Armour & Cumming’s (2008) evidence for developing countries. Interestingly, at a low 
corporate tax rate, we observe a positive effect on the quantity of entrepreneurship for both developed 
and developing countries, suggesting that barriers are conducive to increasing the number of 
businesses (Klapper et al., 2006).  
However, when the tax rate exceeds 60% of commercial profits, the quantity of entrepreneurship 
drops to zero for developed countries. When the tax exceeds 120% the quantity of entrepreneurship 
drops to zero for developing countries. This illustrates the higher resilience of firms in developing 
countries to changes in financial burden, which in some instances could be explained by the presence 
of a larger informal sector than in developed countries (Figure 1E). Additionally, we explored and 
found support for an inverted U-shape effect of tax rates on the quality of entrepreneurship for 
developed countries (Belitski et al. 2016). The positive effect of the tax rate becomes negative once it 
exceeds 60% of commercial profits. In developed countries, a high corporate tax environment 
discourages individuals from becoming involved in entrepreneurial activity. Meanwhile, the lower 
flexibility and lower opportunity costs for entrepreneurs in developing countries lead to a low variance 
in entrepreneurial activity. 
The effect of labor market regulations on the quantity of entrepreneurship supports H3a (Figure 
1F). Labor market-related regulations are generally controlled by the government in developing 
countries and are positively related to a higher quantity of entrepreneurship. This effect could be 
explained by public interest forces (Pigou, 1938), and suggests that regulation is generally devised to 
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provide labor market protection and benefits to the public at large while labor market regulations are 
implemented to correct for market failures and improve public welfare (Pigou, 1938). 
 With regards to bankruptcy law, an increase in the strength of resolving insolvency reflects the 
legal consequences of personal bankruptcy. The cost and time of resolving insolvency are positively 
associated with new business ownership rates in developed and developing countries. The effect is 
stronger in developing countries supporting H3a once the index value is in the third quartile, which 
indicates that the relationship is non-linear (Figure 1G) (Armour & Cumming 2006, 2008). The size of 
the effect of bankruptcy law on entrepreneurial start-ups demonstrates that it is a crucial element of the 
regulatory business environment (Fan & White, 2003). 
For labor market regulations, we do not find support for H3b. This is because the quality of 
entrepreneurship is unlikely to change between developed and developing countries under various 
degrees of labor market regulation. Interestingly we do find support for H3b for the bankruptcy 
regulation, with the effect on the quality of entrepreneurial activity being stronger for developing 
countries (Figure 1G). While we found mixed and unexpected results related to the effect of the 
regulatory environment on the quality and quantity of entrepreneurship, our findings suggest a 
nonlinear relationship between the magnitude of fiscal policy and labor market regulation and both 
types of entrepreneurship (Figure 1G). We find that entrepreneurs in developing countries are likely to 
benefit more from the improvement of bankruptcy laws than entrepreneurs in developed countries (Fan 
& White, 2003). This indicates that changes in the quality of institutions are able to bring developing 
economies closer to the production frontier relative to developed countries. It is likely that bankruptcy 
laws provide greater legal support for entrepreneurs in developing countries where informal 
institutions would otherwise regulate the insolvency (Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2011).  
Hypotheses H4a and H4b are supported (Fig.1H) by showing corruption acts as grease’ than sand 
for the wheel of business (Méon & Weill, 2010), with the effect being stronger for developing 
countries (Mohammadi Khyareh, 2017). In developed countries with higher-quality institutions, 
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corruption works as an additional tax (Belitski et al. 2016) and has a negative impact on entry when 
the corruption is in its fourth quintile (>1.5 see Fig.1H). We find the relationship between corruption 
and the quality of entrepreneurship for both developed and developing countries follows an inverted 
U-shape. Low corruption creates financial incentives and increases the rate of return for entrepreneurs 
who are likely to bolster the productive type of entrepreneurial activity (Baumol, 1990; Sobel, 2008). 
Corruption influences entrepreneurial decision-making differently in different institutional 
environments, with a sharp fall in the quality of entrepreneurship in the second quartile of corruption 
(>-0.5 see Fig.1H). Meanwhile, the quality of entrepreneurship remains unaffected in the developing 
country context, which supports H4b. 
We found support for H5a. The supply-side of entrepreneurship (Sobel, 2008) is enhanced by 
greater government support (Figure 1J). An increase in government size in developed countries is 
likely to create additional support and resources for high-quality labor, which is likely to exploit 
opportunities for productive entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990, Sobel, 2008). At the same time, an 
increase in government size increases tax revenues from productive entrepreneurship (see Fig 1J) 
(Estrin & Mickiewicz, 2011).  
Finally, our H6a and 6b are supported as we found government programs have a positive effect on 
the quantity of entrepreneurship, with the effect being stronger in developing countries as a supply-
side effect of government (Sobel, 2008) (Figure 1K). At the same time, high-quality government 
programs are able to filter unproductive entrepreneurship and attract productive entrepreneurs by 
creating a system of incentives (Sobel, 2008). These incentives are likely to facilitate innovation and 
the growth aspirations of individuals, increasing the quality of entrepreneurship. Productive 
entrepreneurs in developing and developed countries may benefit equally from the quality program 
(which is the third quartile in Fig. 1K) supporting H6b, where such programs aim to provide quality 
training while shielding entrepreneurs from dealing with corrupt authorities and weak institutions 
(Sobel, 2008). We also conducted several robustness check that are included in the online appendix.             
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Conclusion 
Policymakers and scholars have promoted entrepreneurship as a source of economic development, 
and many countries have adopted policies intended to promote entrepreneurship. Despite this, not all 
countries enjoy an equally-positive ‘domino effect’ of the entrepreneurship. The results of this study 
suggest that the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship is more nuanced. For example, 
the relationship may exhibit a non-linear pattern, or differ across countries with different levels of 
economic development and for the quality and quantity of entrepreneurship (Cumming & Li, 2013).  
This study built on Baumol’s theory to examine the size and strength of the relationship between 
each of six institutional dimensions and the quality and quantity of entrepreneurship at different levels 
of economic development (Baumol, 1990; Sobel, 2008; Djankov et al. 2002; Cumming & Li, 2013). 
Secondly, this study combined North’s (1990) institutional theory, Williamson’s (2000) institutional 
hierarchy approach, Whitley’s (1999) NBS perspective and Baumol’s (1990) theory, and applied it to 
the economic development perspective (Rodrik et al., 2004; Wennekers et al., 2005). This theoretical 
synthesis demonstrates that the role of some institutions has become critical to the quality of 
entrepreneurship, in particular for developing countries. Such institutions include debt and VC 
availability (Cumming & Zhang, 2016; Cole et al., 2016), bankruptcy law (Armour & Cumming, 
2006, 2008) and government programs to support entrepreneurship (Cumming et al., 2017; Cumming 
& Johan, 2013). Although the prior literature has demonstrated that the size and strength of the 
relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship varies with the country’s economic 
development, there has been little research into which institutions have the most significant impact on 
the quality and quantity of entrepreneurship and why. The empirical evidence found in this paper 
suggests that an improvement in institutional quality has a greater effect on the quantity and quality of 
entrepreneurship in developing economies than in developed economies. A type of institutional 
framework becomes an important boundary condition for the quality and quantity of entrepreneurial 
activity (Holcombe, 2000).  
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This paper makes a methodological contribution by merging data from various sources within an 
international context to establish and test the relationship between heterogeneous institutional 
dimensions and types of entrepreneurial activity. Drawing on Cumming and Li (2013) but unlike Sobel 
(2008), we use panel data which enables the consistent and robust estimation of the stated relationship 
over time. We created a new measure of entrepreneurship quality which adds to the originality of this 
study. Our explanatory variables reflect institutional dimensions either for the first time (equity 
financing, bankruptcy laws, and government programs) or as a novel application within the existing 
literature on institutions and entrepreneurship (corruption, government size, tax policy and labor 
regulation).  
The results are both unexpected and intriguing. They confirm and extend Baumol’s theory within 
the international context and over time, while also proving some of the recent findings for the US 
(Cole et al., 2016) and other developed (Armour & Cumming, 2006, 2008) and developing countries 
(Mohammadi Khyareh, 2017) on the role of specific institutions in the international context. This 
model and methodology could be applied to countries at different levels of economic development and 
with different entrepreneurial profiles. It can also be generalized. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This study has several limitations which should be addressed in future research. Firstly, our 
findings are limited to 70 countries at different levels of economic development. We used unbalanced 
data with an unequal number of observations during 2005-2015, which we leveraged by performing 
FE and RE estimations as well as by using lagged independent variables. Additional combinations of 
country, institutional and business profiles could be used to construct a net productivity score. More 
work on cross-country comparisons and data collection should be done. Future research could also 
experiment with various proxies for productive and unproductive entrepreneurial behavior. Second, it 
is unlikely to assume that linear relationships could continue at the same rate for an indefinite time and 
improve the quantity and quality of entrepreneurship equally. This study tested for nonlinear effects 
with predictive margins along the range of variation in independent and dependent variables. However, 
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it is important to address non-linear effects explicitly with the new data, including cross-country and 
multilevel region-country effects. Our results on corruption, government size, taxation and business 
opportunities which were found the nonlinear call for further research and careful policy design.  
Third, subsequent studies should focus on measuring the extent and possible changes in direction 
of the effect between institutions and entrepreneurship in explaining the role which formal and 
informal institutions play for various types of entrepreneurship. Future research will also pay attention 
to informal institutions within countries as these are harder to change than formal institutions. It is 
worth understanding whether changes in formal institutions initiated by productive entrepreneurs can 
also have a positive spillover on informal institutions through increased trust in the government and 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Forth, while we matched country data from several sources we were 
unable to include data from other sources around the world to measure entrepreneurship (Cumming et 
al 2014). This is a limitation as for the quality of entrepreneurship, as well as inferences regarding the 
impact of entrepreneurship, may differ depending on the source of the data examined. Subsequent 
research would make an important contribution to the literature by testing for the validity of 
Cumming’s et al. (2014) findings by examining the relationship between economic development, 
entrepreneurship types and various institutional dimensions.  
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Table 1 Definition of variables and 
sources
Mean S.D Min Max
Between 3.7 1.51 17.03
Within  1.47 -1.79 13.26
Between 25.17 -49.03 47.07
Within  5.83 -26.25 14.18
Between 40.33 9.15 182.72
Within  8.82 17.13 103.31
Between 0.67 1.79 4.42
Within  0.22 1.89 4.29
Between 0.76 2.11 5.13
Within  0.24 2.31 4.45
Between 14.92 13.21 84.78
Within  4.35 26.19 67.91
Between 15.81 8.38 85.03
Within  6.55 14.32 60.7
Between 14.8 34.33 96.72
Within  4.48 46.61 85.83
Between 16.99 11.3 111.56
Within  4.62 25.73 67.95
Between 21.09 0 93.75
Within  1.01 57.35 82.35
Between 1 -2.43 1.1
Within  0.12 -0.94 0.16
Between 4.96 2.8 26
Within  1.16 11.24 21.84
Between 0.43 1.78 3.59
Within  0.16 1.94 3.12
Between 0.47 0 1
Within  0.09 -0.41 1.12
Between 1.64 13.15 21.01
Within  0.04 16.57 17.01
Between 4.79 0.39 27.49
Within  2.08 -0.68 20.31
Between 61.55 24.96 388.91
Within  10.04 52.62 142.09
Between 12.6 0 50.76
Within  4.13 -16.24 29.38
Between 3.87 17.51 65.52
Within  2.2 1 11.6
Between 0.71 3.83 10.27
Within  0.46 4.97 7.28
Between 0.12 6.01 6.94
Within  0.22 0 1
Between 0.17 -0.61 0.69
Within  12.6 0 50.76
Between 7.49 1 38
Within  1.28 1.83 19.83
Between 25.57 0 99.81
Within  5.07 18.66 88.64
Variables Definition
Va
ria
n ce
 
Data Panel sample =626 obs.
Quantity New business ownership rate as % 18-64 population who 
are owners of a new business between 3 and 42 months
GEM 5.36
Venture 
capital (H1)
In your country, how easy is it for start-up entrepreneurs 
with innovative but risky projects to obtain equity 
funding? [1 = extremely difficult; 7 = extremely easy]
WEF 2.93
Equity In your country, to what extent can companies raise 
money by issuing shares and/or bonds on the capital 
market? [1 = not at all; 7 = to great extent]
WEF 3.77
Quality Net entrepreneurship productivity (NEP) score calculated 
as the difference between unproductive and productive 
entrepreneurial scores (Sobel, 2008) using the Borda 
count avg. scale 1–74
GEM 
WIPO, 
WEF
-2.44
Credit (H1) Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% GDP) refers 
to financial resources provided to the private sector by 
other depository corporations (deposit taking 
corporations except central banks).
WDI 65.05
Tax Rate 
(H3)
The amount of taxes and mandatory contributions 
payable by businesses after accounting for allowable 
deductions and exemptions as a share of commercial 
profits.
DB 63.57
Labor 
regulation 
(H3)
The labor freedom (inverse) considers various aspects of 
the legal and regulatory framework of a country’s labor 
market ranges from zero= less or no regulation to 
100=over regulations
EFI 42.11
Capital 1 
(H2)
Percentage of 18-64 population who believe they have the 
required skills and knowledge to start a business
GEM 50.88
Capital 2 
(H2)
Percentage of 18-64 who see good opportunities to start a 
firm in the area where they live
GEM 41.09
Spending 
(H5)
The level of government expenditures including 
consumption and transfers (a percentage of GDP).
EFI 16.06
Programs 
(H6)
The presence and quality of programs directly assisting 
the SMEs at all levels of government (national, regional 
municipal) (scale 1 to 5)
GEM 2.56
Insolvency 
index (H3)
Strength of insolvency framework index [1= extremely 
difficult; 100 = extremely efficient]
DB 59.62
Corruption 
level (H4)
Corruption measure captures perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain Index 
ranges from [-2.5= no corruption to 2.5=high corruption].
WGI -0.31
Unemploym
ent
Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that 
is without work but available for and seeking employment. 
(% of total labor force)
WDI 8.32
Trade Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services to gross domestic product of a country.
WDI 91.35
Rich Binary variable=1 for countries with GDP per capita in 
2010 USD constant prices greater or equal 25,000USD; 
zero otherwise.
WDI 0.34
Population Population 15-64 years as % of the total population. The 
population is based on the de facto population, which 
counts all residents regardless of legal status or 
citizenship. (% of total)
WDI 16.84
Property The number of procedures requires to register property, in 
a given country-year
DB 5.83
Contracts The number of days required to enforce a contract, in a 
given country-year, in logarithms
DB 6.28
Natural 
resources
Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, 
natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, 
and forest rents (% to country GDP).
WDI 8.84
Human 
capital
Total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 to 8), 
regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total 
population of the five-year age group following on from 
secondary school leaving.
WDI 45.51
Insolvency 
recovery 
Resolving Insolvency recovery rate (cents on the dollar) DB 49.92
Reform Binary variable of entrepreneurship reform in a country-
year, 1 – if country implemented reform to stimulate 
entrepreneurship, zero otherwise.
GEM 0.09
Insolvency 
Cost
Resolving Insolvency Cost (% of estate) DB 13.28
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     Source: calculation based on GEM – Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), WEF – World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 
(2005-2016), DB= World Bank Doing Business Statistics; WDI= World Bank World Development Indicators; EFI= Economic Freedom Index, 
Heritage Foundation; WIPO=World Intellectual Property Organization; WGI= World Governance Indicator World Bank
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Table 2 
Fixed effects (FE) and random effect (RE) estimation with interactions (DV: new business ownership rate, %, quantity 
and NEP score, quality). 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Method RE RE FE FE RE RE FE FE
DV: entrepreneurship quantity quality quantity quality quantity quality quantity quality
0.01 0.08** -0.01 0.09** 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05)
0.27 3.32* 0.37 0.32 -0.01 6.17† -0.13 0.22
(0.46) (1.83) (0.40) (1.55) (1.08) (3.72) (0.70) (2.71)
-0.47 3.88* -1.11** 5.94** -0.53† 4.74* -1.02† 9.57**
(0.47) (2.11) (0.35) (1.37) (0.35) (2.77) (0.56) (2.17)
0.06** -0.07 0.07** -0.06 0.07** -0.05 0.08** -0.06
(0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.10) (0.02) (0.07)
0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04
(0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.08) (0.01) (0.05)
-0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.13* -0.01 -0.05† -0.02 -0.15**
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07)
0.04* 0.07 0.07** 0.08 0.07** 0.06 0.10** 0.06
(0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06) (0.03) (0.10) (0.02) (0.07)
0 0.14 0.02* 0.15 0.01* 0.19 0.01* 0.21
(0.02) (0.14) (0.01) (0.10) 0.00 (0.15) 0.00 (0.15)
0.25 -8.75** 0.84 -4.96* 1.03* -7.19* 1.78** -4.86*
(0.41) (2.43) (0.53) (2.05) (0.59) (3.26) (0.64) (2.46)
-0.15* -0.29 -0.09 -0.50* -0.18* -0.31 -0.10* -0.58*
(0.08) (0.38) (0.07) (0.25) (0.09) (0.41) (0.06) (0.28)
0.99* 4.54† 0.82* 4.94** 1.34† 4.54* 0.91** 4.83**
(0.57) (2.37) (0.41) (1.60) (0.74) (2.54) (0.46) (1.86)
-1.74** -1.18 -1.86* -6.78* 1.16 56.29* 14.47 -92.59
(0.50) (3.58) (0.77) (2.99) (4.73) (22.03) (28.99) (112.14)
0.24 -3.10* -2.8 16.93 0.1 -3.20* -3.79 15.81
(0.23) (1.26) (2.40) (9.26) (0.28) (1.35) (2.45) (9.47)
-0.01 -0.11 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.23 -0.03 -0.21
(0.04) (0.18) (0.04) (0.15) (0.04) (0.19) (0.04) (0.16)
-0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
-0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.10) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.10) (0.02) (0.07)
-0.01 0.10† 0.01 -0.08 -0.01 0.13† 0.01 0.01*
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.70) (0.02) 0.00
0.19 0.24 0.35** 0.62* 0.15 0.33* 0.28** 0.83**
(0.13) (0.41) (0.10) (0.35) (0.13) (0.20) (0.10) (0.40)
0.09 1.45 0.5 4.33* 0.3 0.82 0.55 4.06
(0.52) (2.39) (0.65) (2.52) (0.60) (2.48) (0.69) (2.66)
0.43 3.50* 0.80** 3.99* 0.60† 4.02* 0.96* 4.16**
(0.51) (1.64) (0.40) (1.56) (0.40) (1.76) (0.41) (1.57)
0.09* -0.30* 0.12* -0.44* 0.09* -0.30† 0.11* -0.46*
(0.05) (0.18) (0.05) (0.20) (0.05) (0.18) (0.05) (0.20)
0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.06)
0.01 0.08 0.02† 0.08
(0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.06)
0.15 -4.5 0.4 0.13
(1.16) (4.35) (0.84) (3.25)
-0.06* -0.04 -0.08* 0.04
(0.03) (0.17) (0.04) (0.16)
0.03* -0.04 0.04† -0.08
(0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.09)
-0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.29*
(0.02) (0.15) (0.04) (0.14)
0.01 -0.39 -0.16 0.99
(0.04) (0.25) (0.35) (1.36)
-0.07** 0.02 -0.10** 0.13
(0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.12)
-1.1 -4.4 -1.54 -4.11
(1.05) (5.46) (1.22) (4.71)
0.15 0.01 0.19 0.4
(0.12) (0.67) (0.16) (0.61)
-1.15 -2.08 -0.62 -1.44
(0.96) (3.47) (0.89) (3.44)
Year  and country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
-4.79 -8.66 45.49 -339.3** -4.42 -14.27 60.68 -323.1**
(6.45) (31.79) (41.10) (158.65) (7.11) (10.01) (41.92) (145.14)
F stat / chi-square 113.17 439.28 3.59 4.53 334.16 693.19 3.31 3.95
Sigma u 2.22 11.64 6.14 41.1 2.48 11.76 7.94 48.58
Sigma e 1.46 5.66 1.46 5.66 1.44 5.6 1.44 5.6
Rho 0.69 0.8 0.94 0.98 0.74 0.81 0.96 0.98
Theta  50 0.79 0.84 0.81 0.85
t-test for βdebt financing=βcapital financing (p-value) 0.22 0.03 0.21 0.04 0.23 0.04 0.19 0.05
Variance inflation factors ( VIF average) 2.2 5.92 8.36 9.04
Constant
Spending x Rich (H5)
Programs x Rich (H6)
Labor regulation x Rich (H3)
Corruption level x Rich (H4)
Tax Rate x Rich (H3)
Bankruptcy law x Rich (H3)
Capital 1 x Rich  (H2)
Capital 2 x Rich  (H2)
Venture capital x Rich (H1)
Contracts
Reform
Insolvency cost
Insolvency recovery 
Credit x Rich (H1)
Population
Unemployment
Trade
Natural resources
Human capital
Property
Labor regulation (H3)
Insolvency framework index (H3)
Corruption level (H4)
Spending (H5)
Programs (H6)
Rich
Credit (H1)
Venture capital (H1)
Equity
Capital 1, skills  (H2)
Capital 2 , opportunity (H2)
Tax Rate (H3)
 
Notes: **- significant at 0.01; *- significant at 0.05; † - significant at 0.1 Standard errors are in parentheses robust to 
heteroscedasticity. As a robustness check, standard errors were also clustered by country. A year and country dummies are 
suppressed to save space. Number of countries: 70; Number of obs. 626. F Test for all u=0 is rejected, hence country fixed effects 
should be estimated. Hausman test reports F statistics=56 with the null is rejected. As a robustnes check the VIF average is 
calculated based on a reduced model (1) excluding three variables with the highest level of individual multicollinearity: equity 
financing, population and contracts. VIF results are within the accaptable boundaries and reduced model supports the findings of 
the initial model (1). Source: authors’ calculation based on GEM, WEF, DB, WDI, EFI, LFI, WIPO and WGI. 
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Figure 1 
Quantity of entrepreneurship (new business ownership rate, %, left column) and quality of entrepreneurship 
(net entrepreneurial productivity score, right column) 
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Source: authors’ calculation based on GEM – Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), WEF – World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness 
Report (2005-2016), DB= World Bank Doing Business Statistics; WDI= World Bank World Development Indicators; EFI= Economic Freedom 
Index, Heritage Foundation; LFI=Labor Freedom Index, Heritage Foundation; WIPO=World Intellectual Property Organization; WGI= World 
Governance Indicator World Bank.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
